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本文尝试通过对詹森——麦克林模型的拓展来解释我国股票市场比较普遍的大股东侵占上市公司资产的行为。一般模型表明,“一股独大”的股权结构并不是大股东侵占行为产生的充分条件,诱导大股东如此行为的因素还包括大股东属下的其他经营单元的相对经营状况、大股东在上市公司的股份大小及经营者的在职消费倾向等。具体到我国股市来看,国有股、拆分式的上市方式、畸高的发行市盈率等因素大大增强了大股东侵占上市公司资产的动力。
This paper attempts to explain the behavior of the majority shareholders in China’s stock market to encroach on the assets of listed companies through the expansion of the Jensen-Macklin model. The general model shows that the ownership structure of “single largest” is not a sufficient condition for major shareholder encroachment. The factors inducing such behavior include the relative operating conditions of other business units under major shareholder, The size of the shares of the company and the incumbent’s pro-consumption propensity. Specific to China’s stock market point of view, state-owned shares, split listing, abnormally high price-earnings ratio and other factors greatly enhance the majority shareholder assets of listed companies invade the impetus.