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基于机制设计理论,分析市场环境下新的电力普遍服务实现机制问题。从电力监管机构的角度,针对电力普遍服务的公共物品特性和信息不对称性,同时考虑电网公司提供电力普遍服务的个人理性和激励相容两个约束条件,建立一种具有激励相容特性的电力普遍服务模型,通过求解模型得到最优激励合同。分析合同参数设定问题及其对电网公司努力水平及收益、电力监管机构效用等的影响。算例分析表明,电网公司提供电力普遍服务的努力水平越高自身收益就越大,电力监管机构效用和社会整体福利也越大。该机制可以激励电网公司不断提高电力普遍服务水平空间,能够实现电网公司、电力监管机构和社会多方共赢,实现电力普遍服务最优化。
Based on mechanism design theory, this paper analyzes the problem of new universal service realization mechanism in electricity market. From the perspective of the electricity regulatory agency, aiming at the public goods characteristics and information asymmetry of universal service of electric power, considering the two constraints of individual rationality and incentive compatibility for providing universal service of electric power companies, a kind of incentive compatible characteristic Electricity universal service model, through the solution model to obtain the optimal incentive contract. Analyze the problem of contract parameter setting and its impact on the level and benefits of power grid companies, the effectiveness of power regulators and so on. The case study shows that the higher the level of efforts of grid companies to provide universal service for electric power, the greater their own return and the greater the utility and social welfare of the electric power regulator. This mechanism can motivate the power grid companies to continuously improve the universal service level space of power, and to achieve win-win situations for power grid companies, power regulatory agencies and the society, and optimize the universal power service.