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基于委托代理框架,已有研究聚焦于独立董事的治理作用,而非执行董事往往由大股东推举委派,更加独立于管理层,董事的技术背景对研发活动也有积极影响。因此,基于2007-2014年上市公司数据,以可操控研发费用为研究视角,运用PSM方法考察技术非执行董事对真实盈余管理的抑制作用。研究表明,技术非执行董事能够有效监督管理层操控研发费用,抑制真实盈余管理;进一步,相比于非国有背景,国有背景下技术非执行董事抑制管理层操控研发费用的效果更为明显;股权集中度较高时,技术非执行董事的治理效果更为突出。这为技术非执行董事发挥治理作用提供了理论与经验证据,同时为我国政府与企业在完善董事会制度、提高盈余质量等方面提供建议。
Based on the principal-agent framework, research has focused on the governance role of independent directors. Non-executive directors are often delegated by major shareholders and are more independent of management. The directors’ technical background also has a positive impact on research and development activities. Therefore, based on the data of listed companies from 2007 to 2014, using the controllable R & D costs as the research perspective, we use the PSM method to examine the inhibitory effect of the technical non-executive directors on the real earnings management. The research shows that non-executive directors can effectively supervise management’s R & D expenses and restrain the real earnings management. Furthermore, compared with the non-state-owned background, the non-executive directors have more obvious effect of restraining management from controlling the R & D expenses in the state-owned enterprises. When the degree of concentration is high, the effect of technical non-executive directors is more prominent. This provides theoretical and empirical evidence for the non-executive directors playing a governance role, and provides suggestions for our government and enterprises to improve the system of the board of directors and improve the quality of the earnings.