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为了分析合约不完全、技术互补和技术选择的关系,我们构建了一个可分析处理的理论模型。在我们的模型中,企业在与中间投入供应商达成的可置约活动中选择自己的技术和投资水平,供应商则选择在不可置约的活动中的投资水平,并从事后议价中获得支付。本文表明,合约越不完全,企业采用的技术则越不先进:中间投入的互补性越大,合约不完全程度的影响就越大。我们考察了该模型的一些应用,结果发现:我们所提出的机制在不同的国家和不同签约制度中产生了很大的生产率差异,而由不同签约制度产生的生产率差异会导致相当大的比较优势差异。
In order to analyze the relationship between incomplete contract, complementary technology and technical choice, we constructed a theoretical model which can be analyzed and processed. In our model, the firm chooses its own technology and investment level among the contractible activities it enters into with the intermediary, and the supplier selects the level of investment in the non-compliances and pays for post-negotiation . This article shows that the less complete the contract, the less advanced the technology employed by the firm: the greater the complementarity of the intermediate inputs, the greater the impact of the incompleteness of the contract. We examine some of the applications of this model and find that the mechanism we propose produces large differences in productivity in different countries and in different contracting systems and that differences in productivity due to different contracting systems can lead to considerable comparative advantage difference.