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在一个委员会的决策制度中,某个个体成员的权力可定义为:个体决策者成为获胜联盟获得成功时的关键投票者的机会,或者定义为成功阻止本来要获胜的联盟的机会。通过随机安排投票顺序,每个投票者处于关键位置的次数被计算出来,由此而确定的便是投票者的权力指数。在给定模型下所得到的指数是委员会体制中各成员权力分布的先验评估。一个更强的论断是:计算委员会制度中成员之间的权力分布的任一模型,若不满足该权力指数定义,就会导致逻辑上的不一致。该方法能够用来计算联合国安理会、美国国会等决策机构的权力分布。该方法可以说明:通常只需要一小部分的股票就能够控制一个公司,掌权的集团通常能够召集足够的代理人去维持它的地位,因为股东的权力也不与他们所持的股票成正比,而是偏向大股东。权力指数反映了委员会制度本身的一个基本要素,权力指数的出现能够为立法机构和政策制定部门的基本设计提供有效信息。
In a committee’s decision-making system, the power of an individual member can be defined as the chance that an individual decision-maker becomes the key voter at the time the winning coalition becomes successful, or as a chance to succeed in preventing the coalition that would otherwise have won. By randomly arranging the voting order, the number of times each voter is in a key position is calculated, and thus the voter’s power index is determined. The index obtained under a given model is a priori assessment of the distribution of power among the members of the committee system. A stronger assertion is that any model that calculates the distribution of power among members in a commission system can lead to logical inconsistency if it does not satisfy the definition of the index of power. This method can be used to calculate the power distribution of decision-making bodies such as the UN Security Council and the U.S. Congress. This method shows that a company can usually be controlled by only a small fraction of the stock and the group in power usually can summon sufficient agents to maintain its position because the shareholders’ power is not directly proportional to the stock they hold Is biased toward the major shareholder. The index of power reflects an essential element of the Commission’s system itself, and the emergence of a power index can provide valid information for the basic design of legislative bodies and policy-making departments.