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本文构造多种监管有效性表征变量,重点考察独立董事和机构投资者这两种资本市场治理新参与者的实际监管效率。研究发现独立董事比例较高或机构投资者持股比例较高的样本,出现违规行为或信息披露不完全、不真实的概率较低,但在抑制关联交易或以“圈钱”为目的的配股增发行为中,两者的作用都没有得到实证支持。研究结果还显示,在监管有效性比较中,独立董事、机构投资者均起着积极的作用,独立董事的作用相对更为明显,而监事会的作用不显著。
This article constructs a variety of regulatory effectiveness of the characterization variables, focusing on independent directors and institutional investors, two new governance of capital markets governance, the effective supervision of the participants. The study found that the samples with higher proportion of independent directors or institutional investors with higher proportion of shares held the lower probability of incomplete or untrue disclosures of illegal acts or disclosures. However, in the case of inhibiting related party transactions or rights issue with the purpose of “misappropriating money” In addition, the role of both have not been empirically supported. The results also show that both independent directors and institutional investors play a positive role in the comparison of regulatory effectiveness. The role of independent directors is relatively more obvious, while the role of the supervisory board is not significant.