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众筹面向的是小额的、分散的公众投资者,高昂的信息成本、“搭便车”的心态以及缺乏投资经验,使得众筹投资者面临着比其他传统的投资方式更加严重的信息不对称问题,这是众筹这种融资结构必然导致的问题。本文通过对众筹结构中信息不对称问题及其缓解机制的研究发现,虽然传统上常用的强制信息披露和声誉体系等机制与众筹并不能完全契合,但是众筹面向大规模小额投资者的特点,也使其发展出独有的信息发现和传递机制:理性的集体行动、社会关系的网络化都能够有效缓解信息不对称风险。鉴于众筹结构的特性,对于众筹的监管应当尽量发挥既有的信息发现机制的作用,从而实现缓解信息不对称的目标。
Crowdfunding faces small, dispersed public investors, high information costs, “free-riding” mentality, and a lack of investment experience that crowdfunding investors face more serious problems than other traditional forms of investment Asymmetric issues, which are the inevitable problems caused by crowdfunding of such financing structures. This paper studies the problem of asymmetric information in crowdfunding structure and its mitigating mechanism and finds that while the commonly used mechanisms such as compulsory information disclosure and reputation system do not fit well with crowdfunding, crowdfunding targets large-scale small investors It also makes it develop a unique information discovery and transmission mechanism: rational collective action and network of social relations can effectively mitigate the risk of information asymmetry. In view of the characteristics of the crowdfunding structure, the regulation of crowdfunding should try its best to play the role of the existing information discovery mechanism to achieve the goal of alleviating the information asymmetry.