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本文以资本投资作为控制权收益主要来源为理论基础,结合我国目前新兴加转轨的市场背景,选取2001-2013年沪深两市A股市场发生了股权转让的上市公司为样本,对不同资本投向对控制权私利攫取的影响进行了实证研究。结果发现:(1)限售股解禁后的控制权私利水平高于解禁前的私利水平;(2)固定资产投资规模与控制权私利水平正相关,限售股解禁后,其正相关关系有所削弱;(3)股权投资规模与控制权私利水平正相关,限售股解禁后,控制权私利水平对股权投资规模更为敏感;(4)控股股东的自利性资本投资行为挤占了中小投资者的共享收益,而这种行为并没有因为股改的完成而发生本质性的转变。在以上结论基础上,提出了相关的政策建议。
In this paper, capital investment as the main source of control returns as the theoretical basis, combined with China’s emerging and transitional market background, select the 2001-2013 Shanghai and Shenzhen A shares market share transfer of listed companies as a sample of different capital investment Empirical research is conducted on the impact of private gain of control. The results showed that: (1) the level of self-interest in controlling power after the restriction of the sale of restricted shares was higher than that before the ban; (2) The scale of fixed asset investment was positively related to the level of self-interest in control. After the restriction on the sale of restricted shares, the positive correlation was (3) The scale of equity investment is positively correlated with the level of private profit of control. After the restricted shares are lifted, the level of self-interest in control is more sensitive to the scale of equity investment; (4) Self-interest capital investment by controlling shareholders is squeezed into small and medium-sized Investors share of revenue, and this behavior did not occur due to the completion of stock reform and an essential change. Based on the above conclusions, the relevant policy suggestions are put forward.