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近年来,我国上市公司的“分红”政策一直受到社会各界的关注,大量的研究表明国有上市公司较非国有更倾向于进行现金分红。特别是随着国有上市公司派现数量的逐年增多,为规范其“分红”行为,避免国有资产的流失,国有上市公司“分红”的动因值得进一步探讨。因此文章选取2007-2012年深沪A股的国有上市公司为研究样本,选择控股大股东、市场中小投资者为主要研究对象,经过实证考察了这两者与国有上市公司“分红”的内在联系。研究结果表明国有上市公司在“分红”中存在“双重”迎合现象:一方面,企业发放红利为大股东输送上市公司的现金提供了可能,企业管理者迫于大股东的控制权不得不去迎合其对现金股利的需求,而有效的制衡可以约束大股东行为;另一方面,企业管理者为了能迅速提升企业价值,彰显自身才干,也会考虑市场中小投资者对现金股利的偏好而采取迎合性的“分红”政策。
In recent years, the “dividend ” policy of listed companies in our country has been paid close attention by all walks of life. A large number of studies show that state-owned listed companies are more likely to pay cash dividends than non-state-owned ones. Especially with the increase of the number of state-owned listed companies, the motivation of state-owned listed companies “dividends ” deserved further discussion in order to regulate its “dividend ” behavior and avoid the loss of state-owned assets. Therefore, the article chooses the listed companies in Shenzhen and Shanghai A shares from 2007 to 2012 as the research samples, selects the controlling shareholder and small and medium-sized investors as the main research object, and empirically examines the relationship between these two and the state-owned listed companies “dividend ” inner relationship. The results show that state-owned listed companies have “double ” in “dividend ” to cater to the phenomenon: on the one hand, the dividend distribution for the major shareholder of listed companies to provide cash, corporate managers forced the control of major shareholders Have to meet their needs for cash dividends, and effective checks and balances can constrain the behavior of major shareholders; the other hand, business managers in order to quickly enhance the value of enterprises, demonstrate their talent, will also consider the market for small investors cash dividends Preference and take to meet the “dividend ” policy.