论文部分内容阅读
本文通过一个扩展的时间配置模型发现,在风险规避的假定条件下,政府增加社会福利支出可以减少个体决策者从事“非法”活动的时间。基于2000～2006年间中国30个省级截面的数据分析结果也证实,在控制住“非法”和“合法”工资以及失业率等变量后,地方政府无论是增加救济费支出还是社会保障补助支出都可以显著地降低犯罪率,总体而言,人均社会福利支出每增加1%大约可以使犯罪率降低0.19%。如果上述发现是成立的,一方面,间接性的支持社会福利条件的弱化是导致中国犯罪率持续上升的一个重要社会根源,另一方面,也意味着提高社会福利条件和改善民生是比单纯的威慑性和惩罚性犯罪治理政策具有更低成本和更高社会收益的犯罪治理策略。
Through an extended model of time allocation, this paper finds that under the assumption of risk aversion, government spending on social welfare can reduce the time for individual decision makers to engage in “illegal” activities. Based on the data analysis of 30 provincial cross-sections from 2000 to 2006, it is also confirmed that after controlling for variables such as “illegal” and “legal” wages and unemployment, local governments, whether increasing relief expenses or social All of these subsidies can significantly reduce the crime rate. For every 1% increase in social welfare expenditure per capita, the crime rate can be reduced by about 0.19%. If the above findings are true, on the one hand, indirect weakening of social welfare conditions is an important social root cause for the continuous rise of criminality in China. On the other hand, it means that improving social welfare conditions and improving people’s livelihood are simpler Deterrent and punitive criminal governance policies have a lower cost and higher social benefits of crime governance strategies.