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基于非合作博弈理论研究了同时具有价格和服务竞争的零售商团购博弈。首先,建立了仅有两个零售商参与的团购博弈模型,给出了该博弈存在唯一纯战略纳什均衡解的充分条件及其理论证据。然后,分别对非对称性零售商和对称性零售商两种情形下的纳什均衡战略就服务和价格竞争强度、市场需求差异、运作效率差异和服务效率差异进行了比较静态分析。最后,讨论了团购策略对于零售商定价和服务决策的影响。研究表明:①对称性零售商选择团购策略有益于改善最终市场顾客的福利,而且外部供应商可以通过合理设置量折扣计划来实现这种改善;②非对称性零售商在团购情形下,其定价和服务决策通常会随着相互之间差异的改变而表现出相反的变化。
Based on the theory of non-cooperative game, this paper studies the group-buying game of retailers with both price and service competition. First, we establish a buy-out game model involving only two retailers and give the sufficient conditions and theoretical evidences for the existence of the only purely strategic Nash equilibrium. Then, a static comparative analysis of the Nash equilibrium strategy under asymmetric retailers and symmetric retailers is carried out on the differences of service and price competition, market demand differences, operational efficiency differences and service efficiency respectively. Finally, the influence of buy strategy on retailer pricing and service decision is discussed. The results show that: (1) symmetric retailers choose to buy strategy is beneficial to improve the welfare of the final market customers, and external suppliers can achieve this improvement through reasonable volume discount plan; (2) Asymmetric retailers in the group purchase, its pricing And service decisions often show the opposite change as the difference between them changes.