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2010年,Jin等人和Zhang在标准模型下分别设计了一个基于身份的签密方案,并且声称在标准模型下满足IND-CCA的保密安全性和EUF-CMA的不可伪造安全性。通过对这两个方案的安全性进行详细的分析,发现它们并不满足其所声称的安全强度。在严格的签密定义和安全模型下,明确地给出了对这两个方案的实际有效的攻击。最后,进一步分析和总结了这两个方案在其他常用的安全定义下的安全强度。
In 2010, Jin et al. And Zhang designed an identity-based signcryption scheme under the standard model respectively and claimed that the security of IND-CCA and the unforgeability of EUF-CMA were satisfied under the standard model. Through a detailed analysis of the security of these two programs, they found that they did not meet the claimed security strength. Under a strict signcryption definition and security model, the actual and effective attacks on these two scenarios are given explicitly. Finally, the security strength of these two schemes under other commonly used security definitions is further analyzed and summarized.