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为了探究不同功能分类央企中引入机构投资者和股权制衡机制对企业治理水平的影响,以2008-2014年央企A股上市公司为研究样本,在混合所有制背景下基于央企功能分类视角,研究了机构持股、股权制衡对企业效率的影响差异以及股权制衡的调节效应,另外为了保证结论的可靠性还考虑了股权结构内生性问题。实证结果发现,在商业类整体样本中,机构持股比例与企业效率显著正相关,股权制衡度与企业效率显著负相关,股权制衡在机构持股和企业效率之间起到负向调节效应。但不同类型的企业又表现出不同的效应。具体而言,在竞争性商业央企上市公司中,机构持股与企业效率显著正相关,股权制衡度对企业效率无显著影响,股权制衡的负向调节效应显著;在特定功能类商业央企上市公司中,机构持股比例与企业效率有显著正向关系,股权制衡度与企业效率负相关,股权制衡的负向调节效应显著。本研究对央企分类改革中机构投资者的引入提供了有力支撑,有助于加深对股权制衡机制的认识,研究结论对国有企业混合所有制改革中的股权结构调整有重要启示。
In order to explore the impact of introducing institutional investors and equity checks and balances in different functional categories on the corporate governance level, taking the 2008-2014 A-share listed companies of central SOEs as the research sample and based on the functional classification of central SOEs in the context of mixed ownership, The influence of shareholding, equity checks and balances on the efficiency of enterprises, and the regulatory effect of equity checks and balances. In addition, in order to ensure the reliability of conclusions, the endogeneity of ownership structure is also considered. Empirical results show that there is a significant positive correlation between institutional ownership and firm efficiency, negative correlation between equity balance and firm efficiency, and equity balance between institutional ownership and firm efficiency. However, different types of enterprises show different effects. In particular, among the listed companies in the competitive commercial central enterprises, there is a significant positive correlation between institutional ownership and corporate efficiency. Equity balance has no significant effect on the corporate efficiency, and the negative regulatory effect of equity checks and balances is remarkable. In listed companies with certain functional commercial central enterprises, , There is a significant positive relationship between institutional ownership and corporate efficiency, negative correlation between equity balance and corporate efficiency, and negative equity regulatory balance. This study provides strong support for the introduction of institutional investors in the classified reform of the central SOEs and helps to deepen the understanding of the mechanism of checks and balances ownership. The conclusion of the study is of great significance to the readjustment of ownership structure in the mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises.