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通过构建地方政府间投资竞争策略性行为模型,本文分析了完全信息条件下与不完全信息条件下我国地方政府投资竞争行为的博弈表现与纳什均衡,并对比了各种博弈均衡的社会收益问题。在理论分析之后,以我国迅速发展的交通运输事业为例,实证检验了地方政府投资竞争对“硬件”基础设施的改善效应,最后自然得出结论。
By constructing a strategic behavior model of local government investment competition, this paper analyzes the game performance and Nash equilibrium of local government investment competition under the condition of complete information and incomplete information, and compares the social benefits of various game equilibrium. After the theoretical analysis, taking the rapid development of transportation in our country as an example, this paper empirically tests the improvement effect of investment competition of local governments on “hardware ” infrastructure, and concludes the conclusion naturally.