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基于创业投资双方的信息不对称,创业投资双方均不是完全意义的剩余索取权人,会产生双方努力行为不足、以及创业企业家谋取私人收益的视角,将私人收益与努力水平结合起来,进行综合考虑,比较分析了股权契约情况下,双方在信息完全与信息不完全两种情况下的努力水平,得出结论股权契约安排会产生双边道德风险。为解决这一问题,论文改变以往一直讨论的应该选择股权、债权或可转换债券等契约工具来降低双边道德风险的思路,得出结论:通过采取引入私人收益,并通过控制私人收益来间接激励双方的努力的思路,以实现降低或减缓双边道德风险的目的。
Based on the asymmetric information of both venture capitalists and the fact that both parties to the venture capital business are not the full meaning of the residual claimor, there will be a lack of efforts by both parties as well as the perspectives of entrepreneurial entrepreneurs seeking private benefits. By combining the private benefit with the level of effort, Considering and comparing the efforts of both sides under the condition of equity contract, the two sides make efforts to make the conclusion that the equity contract arrangement will bring about bilateral moral hazard. In order to solve this problem, the essay changes the previous ideas that should be used to reduce the bilateral moral hazard by using contractual instruments such as equity, debt or convertible bonds, and concluded that by inducing private benefits and indirectly by controlling private benefits The ideas of the efforts of both parties for the purpose of reducing or mitigating bilateral moral hazard.