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为解决由同一性导致的困难,弗雷格在《概念文字》中为同一性陈述的概念内容设定了特殊规则。弗雷格这种处理方式是值得称道的,但是他不应该止步于此,而是要更进一步推广到同一性陈述以外的问题。继续贯彻弗雷格的上述思路,我们可以通过区分不同层次上的真之条件从而使该解决方案不只局限于同一性陈述上。经过这样的一般化,弗雷格意义上的真之条件实际上只是广泛意义上的真之条件的一个特例。更进一步,将何种意义上的真之条件视为句子的意义如同指出事情发生的原因一样,不过是在寻找J.L.Mackie的因果理论中的所谓INUS条件(而INUS条件恰恰是以实用需要为转移的)而已。这意味着“言语内容”这样的概念也具有相似的误导性。
In order to address the difficulties caused by identity, Frege sets special rules for the conceptual content of the statement of identity in Conceptual Words. Frege’s treatment is commendable, but he should not stop here, but to further promote beyond the statement of identity. Continuing with Frege’s above thinking, we can make the solution not confined to the statement of identity by distinguishing true conditions at different levels. After such generalization, the true conditions in the sense of Frege are in fact only a special case of the true conditions in a broad sense. Further, what is the true condition of the sentence as if the meaning of the sentence is the same as pointing to the cause of the occurrence is simply the search for the so-called INUS condition in JL Mackie’s theory of causality (which is precisely the case of the transfer of practical necessity )) Only. This means that the notion of “speech content” is similarly misleading.