资本支出决策是公司投资决策的主要内容之一,对公司长远发展至关重要。由于公司控股股东占用上市公司资金,我国上市公司的资本支出受到很大限制。机构投资者是公司外部大股东,能够有效监督公司管理层,降低代理成本并解决代理问题。本文的实证结果表明,在上市公司尤其是国有控股上市公司,控股股东持股比例与公司资本支出显著负相关,但机构投资者整体持股及证券投资基金持股与公司资本支出正相关,这说明我国机构投资者整体上能有效制衡控股股东通过关联交易等非资本支出方式侵占公司资金,促进公司资本支出,保护中小投资者利益。本文的贡献在于从资本支出的角度提供了机构投资者对公司进行有效监督的证据,并为我国大力发展机构投资者的相关决策提供了支持性证据。 Capital expenditure decision-making is one of the main elements of a company’s investment decision-making, which is crucial to the long-term development of the company. As the controlling shareholder occupies the funds of listed companies, the capital expenditure of listed companies in our country is greatly restricted. Institutional investors are large shareholders outside the company, can effectively monitor the company’s management, reduce agency costs and solve agency problems. The empirical results show that listed companies, especially state-controlled listed companies, the controlling shareholder’s shareholding ratio is significantly and negatively correlated with the company’s capital expenditure. However, the overall ownership of institutional investors and securities investment fund holdings are positively correlated with the company’s capital expenditure This shows that as a whole, institutional investors in our country can effectively check and control the controlling shareholders’ encroachment of company funds through non-capital expenditures such as connected transactions, promote capital expenditures and protect the interests of small and medium-sized investors. The contribution of this paper is to provide evidence that institutional investors can effectively supervise the company from the perspective of capital expenditure and provide supporting evidence for our country to make great efforts to develop institutional investors.