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社会公益研究对于建设和谐社会具有举足轻重的作用。中央政府与地方政府在社会公益R&D投入中的“跟不上、不跟上”问题①,表明社会公益研究存在严重的制度缺失。正确处理中央政府和地方政府的关系是重建我国社会公益研究投入机制的关键。通过建立博弈分析模型,推导出中央政府和地方政府的三种行为模式组合:“中央单方投入,中央地方双方满足效用最大化”;“中央单方投入,地方单方满足效用最大化”;“中央地方双方投入,地方单方满足效用最大化”。
Social welfare research plays a decisive role in building a harmonious society. The central government and local government’s “not keeping up with, not keeping up with” issues in the R&D of social charity 1 indicates that there are serious institutional flaws in social public welfare research. Correctly handling the relationship between the central government and local governments is the key to rebuilding the input mechanism of social public research in China. Through the establishment of a game analysis model, three types of combinations of behaviors of the central government and local governments are deduced: “Central unilateral input, central and local parties satisfying utility maximization”; “central unilateral input, local unilateral satisfaction of utility maximization” ;“Central and local parties invest in, local unilateral to maximize utility”.