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论文采用交易成本理论下的自我协议理论,探讨交易管制和关系管制对供应商机会主义的复合影响。研究发现,特定联合交易投资和可观察性正向影响关系准则,而关系准则下的准则一致性和准则参与性负向影响供应商机会主义,具体而言,当准则一致性高时,双方为了共同的利益和责任采取行动,从而抑制供应商机会主义;而当准则参与性高时,交易双方共同决策,一起为组织构建目标,也能够限制供应商机会主义的发生。另外研究还检验了监控在关系准则与供应商机会主义之间的调节作用,发现监控水平越高,关系准则控制供应商机会主义的效果越强。
The thesis uses the self-agreement theory under transaction cost theory to discuss the compound influence of transaction control and relationship control on supplier opportunism. The study found that the investment and observability of specific co-operation positively influence the relationship between the norms, and the consistency of the norms under the relationship norms and the participative norms negatively affect supplier opportunism. Specifically, when the coherence of the standards is high, Common interests and responsibilities to restrain supplier opportunism. When the guideline is highly involved, both parties make decisions jointly to build the goal for the organization and also limit supplier opportunism. In addition, the research also examines the regulatory role of monitoring in the relationship between guidelines and supplier opportunism. It is found that the higher the monitoring level, the stronger the effectiveness of the relationship criterion in controlling supplier opportunism.