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作为一种重要的议事规则,资本多数决在公司决策时发挥着不可忽视的作用。一方面,资本多数决原则能够提高公司决策的效率;另一方面,资本多数决原则还能够积极保障投资者的投资热情。在肯定资本多数决原则所具有合理性的同时,也应当看到其在平衡控股股东的中小股东之间利益关系方面所存在的缺陷。如果公司在决策时过度依赖该原则,那么就有可能导致股东之间实质不平等、降低中小股东管理的积极性、股东大会日益形式化等问题。虽然新近修订的《公司法》在降低公司成立门槛等问题上迈出了历史性的一步,但却在股东利益保护的问题上处于尚待改善的状态。本文以资本多数决与股东利益保护之间的冲突问题为研究对象,内容主要包括资本多数决原则概述、资本多数决与股东利益冲突的原因和完善公司资本多数决原则的若干建议。
As an important rule of procedure, the majority of capital plays an important role in corporate decision-making. On the one hand, the principle of capital majority can improve the efficiency of corporate decision-making; on the other hand, the capital majority rule can also actively protect investors’ investment enthusiasm. While affirming the rationality of the capital majority rule, we should also see its shortcomings in balancing the interest relations between the minority shareholders of controlling shareholders. If the company relies too much on this principle in its decision-making, it may lead to substantive inequalities among shareholders, diminish the enthusiasm of the management of small and medium-sized shareholders, and increasingly formalize the shareholders’ general meeting. Although the recently amended “Company Law” has taken a historic step toward reducing the threshold for setting up a company, it is still in a state of great improvement on the protection of shareholders’ interests. This article takes the conflict between the capital majority decision and shareholder interest protection as the research object. The content mainly includes the summary of capital majority rule, the reason of conflict of capital majority decision and shareholder interest, and some suggestions to perfect the capital capital majority rule.