论文部分内容阅读
大型基础设施项目对于一个国家的经济发展举足轻重。这些项目通常是政企(公私)合营的。虽然这一领域有着重大的意义,但是对于这些项目的研究却很少见。本文考察了政企合营中最普遍的一种形式,称为建造—经营—移交(Build-Operate-Transfer,BOT)。我们采用了不完全契约方法,可能的产权安排是这一方法中的关键机制。换句话说,我们建立了一个全新、独特的,称之为所有权机制的方法,来考察BOT契约中的风险分担、激励和监管问题。我们证明了在特许期内具有价格控制以及可延期所有权制度的BOT契约可以是有效率的。如果没有所有权机制,无论是否有价格控制,BOT都不会有效率,而且比私有化更糟糕。相应的,如果没有价格控制,无论有没有所有权机制,BOT都不会有效率。有趣的是,所有权机制和价格控制几乎被现实世界中的每一个BOT项目所采用。
Large-scale infrastructure projects play a significant role in the economic development of a country. These projects are usually joint ventures between government and enterprises (public and private). Although this area has great significance, research on these projects is rare. This paper examines the most common form of government-enterprise joint ventures, called Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT). We have adopted an incomplete contract approach and possible property rights arrangements are the key mechanisms in this approach. In other words, we have established a new and unique method called the ownership mechanism to examine the risk sharing, incentive, and supervision issues in the BOT contract. We have proved that BOT contracts with price control and deferred ownership system during the concession period can be efficient. Without an ownership mechanism, BOT will not be efficient, and it will be worse than privatization, regardless of price controls. Correspondingly, if there is no price control, BOT will not be efficient regardless of ownership mechanism. Interestingly, ownership mechanisms and price controls are used by virtually every BOT project in the real world.