论文部分内容阅读
从旅游劳动合同签约双方围绕商业秘密保护产生的信度预期,构建了混合策略博弈模型,对缔约时签约双方为防止商业秘密泄露所采取的策略行为进行研究。给出了仅对旅游劳动合同签署一方具有约束的单边有效性对策、对旅游劳动合同签署双方同时具有约束的双边有效性策略、以及对旅游劳动合同签署双方具有此消彼长的双边策略性对策;并对三个策略进行了数值模拟。研究结论对一定条件下制定和签署防泄密旅游劳动合同具有应用价值,对各类企业主体签订商业秘密保护的劳动合同和执法机关审查防泄密劳动合同也具有借鉴意义。
Based on the expectation of reliability of commercial secrets protection signed by both parties to the contract of tourism labor contract, a hybrid strategy game model is constructed to study the tactics adopted by both contracting parties to prevent the disclosure of trade secrets. This paper gives a unilateral effective measure that is binding only on the side of the signing of the tourism labor contract and the bilateral effective strategy of both parties signing the contract of tourism labor contract at the same time and has the bilateral strategic sign Countermeasures; and three strategies for numerical simulation. The conclusions of the study have certain application value in formulating and signing the anti-leakage tourism labor contract under certain conditions. It is also of reference to the labor contract that the various types of enterprises sign the protection of trade secrets and the law enforcement agencies to examine the anti-leakage labor contract.