随着以所有权和控制权相分离为特征的现代公司组织的形成和发展,在公司所有者不参与日常管理的前提下,如何通过公司治理机制实现对经理人的激励和约束,使股东财富最大化是现代企业管理的核心问题。本文通过委托-代理理论,对股东和经理人之间的关系进行了分析和研究,试图解释目前我国基于公司治理机制的经理人激励制度中存在的问题。 With the formation and development of modern company organizations characterized by the separation of ownership and control, under the premise of not involving the day-to-day management of the company owners, how to realize the incentive and restraint to the managers through the corporate governance mechanism to maximize shareholder wealth Modernization is the core issue of business management. Through the principal-agent theory, this paper analyzes and studies the relationship between shareholders and managers, trying to explain the problems existing in the current manager incentive system based on the corporate governance mechanism in our country.