论文部分内容阅读
本文用A股上市公司管理层业绩预测和高管交易的数据,从管理层自利动机角度研究了上市公司业绩预测的披露行为。结果发现,高管试图通过业绩预测的发布影响股价,以增加其股票交易的收益。当高管计划买入股票时,为了降低股价,其所在公司发布的好消息少于坏消息;相反,当高管计划卖出股票时,为了抬高股价,公司发布的好消息多于坏消息。进一步研究发现,以上行为在高管亲属交易和公司信息不透明时更加明显。在区分业绩预测的类型后发现,管理层对强制性披露的操纵主要发生在诉讼风险较大的股票减持行为中,而风险较小的股票增持则主要通过自愿性披露进行操纵。本文对管理层利益动机在业绩预测决策过程中的作用机制提供了有力的证据,并为监管机构提高监管效率提供了参考。
In this paper, using the data of A-share listed company’s management performance forecast and executives’ transaction, this paper studies the disclosure behavior of listed company’s performance forecast from the perspective of management’s self-motivation. The results showed that executives tried to influence the stock price through the release of the performance forecast in order to increase the return on their stock trading. When an executive plans to buy a stock, his company publishes less good news than bad news in order to lower its share price. On the contrary, when an executive plans to sell a stock, the company releases more good news than bad news . Further study found that the above behavior is more obvious when the relatives of senior executives trade and the company information is not transparent. After differentiating the types of performance forecasts, it is found that the management’s manipulation of mandatory disclosure mainly occurs in the stock reduction with large litigation risk, while the less risky stock increase is mainly controlled through voluntary disclosure. This article provides a strong evidence for the mechanism of interest motivation in the performance prediction and decision-making process, and provides a reference for regulators to improve supervision efficiency.