论文部分内容阅读
产权交易市场中的不对称信息极易导致风险投资退出过程中的企业价值被低估.而拍卖作为一种信息不对称背景下的价格揭示机制,能够有效地解决价值失真问题.本文结合运用机制设计理论和拍卖理论与方法,设计了一套具有激励相容性和参与约束性的风险投资退出股权拍卖机制.并得到了最优股权拍卖机制,能够促进资源的合理配置,并提高市场交易效率,为政府以及相关部门提供决策参考.
Asymmetric information in the property rights exchange market can easily lead to underestimation of the enterprise value in the process of withdrawal of venture capital.A auction as a mechanism of price disclosure in the context of information asymmetry can effectively solve the problem of value distortion.This paper combines the application of mechanism design Theory and auction theory and method, a set of VC auction mechanism with incentive compatibility and participatory venture capital is designed and the optimal auction mechanism is obtained, which can promote the rational allocation of resources and improve the efficiency of market transactions, For the government and relevant departments to provide decision-making reference.