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结合复杂装备协同创新的特点,基于“主制造商-供应商”协同模式,考虑主制造商的优势地位,从协调激励供应商风险控制为抓手,建立主制造商分担供应商风险控制投入的风险管控最优激励Stackelberg模型。研究给出主制造商最优风险管控成本分担比例、供应商最优风险管控投入以及风险管控最优水平。最后基于风险敏感系数和供应商利益分配比例的系列取值,进行数值仿真分析。研究得出:复杂装备协同创新过程中,供应商的风险管控投入与风险敏感系数成反比,与分配比例成正比;在供应商的最终利润分配比例一定时,供应商最优风险管控水平与风险敏感度成反比,即风险敏感度越大,供应商最优风险管控水平也就越低;主制造商对风险管控投入成本的分摊对供应商的最优风险管控水平起决定作用,主制造商承担的投入比例越大,供应商最优风险管控水平就越低,主制造商承担的投入比例越小,供应商最优风险管控水平也越高。
Considering the dominant position of the main manufacturer based on the synergy mode of “main manufacturer-supplier” and the risk control of suppliers, the risk control of suppliers is taken as the starting point, and the main manufacturer is set up to share the risk control of suppliers The Optimal Incentive Stackelberg Model of Investment Risk Management. The research gives the ratio of cost-sharing of the optimal risk management and control of the major manufacturers, the optimal risk control inputs of the suppliers and the optimal risk management and control. Finally, numerical simulation is carried out based on the series of values of risk-sensitive coefficient and supplier’s profit distribution ratio. The research shows that in the process of collaborative innovation of complex equipment, the risk control inputs of suppliers are inversely proportional to the risk sensitivity coefficient and proportional to the distribution ratio. When the final profit distribution proportion of suppliers is constant, the optimal risk control level and risk of suppliers The sensitivity is inversely proportional to the risk sensitivity, the lower the optimal level of risk management and control of suppliers; the allocation of risk control input costs by the main manufacturer plays a decisive role in the optimal risk control of suppliers, the main manufacturer The greater the proportion of investment commitment, the lower the optimal level of risk management and control of suppliers, the smaller the proportion of investment by the main manufacturer, the higher the optimal risk management and control of suppliers.