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基于双向委托代理模型,本文分析了制造商信息可查证、零售商信息可查证以及双方信息都不可查证情形下的契约选择,研究了供应链中制造商与零售商对产品协同服务的契约选择问题。结果显示:对制造商而言,当零售商的行为可以通过契约来加以规定时,采用固定费用契约可实现双方服务努力的最优解;当制造商的行为可查证时,采用销售许可证契约可实现双方服务努力的最优解;当制造商与零售商的行为不可查证从而导致双边道德风险时,只能实现服务努力的次优解,同时基于产出绩效的契约是最优的。
Based on two-way principal-agent model, this paper analyzes the choice of contract under the condition of verifiable manufacturer information, retailer information can be verified and the information of both parties can not be verified, and studies the contract selection between product manufacturer and retailer in supply chain . The results show that for retailers, when the behavior of retailers can be stipulated by contract, the fixed cost contract can be used to achieve the optimal solution for the service efforts of both parties. When the manufacturer’s behavior can be verified, the sales license contract Which can achieve the optimal solution of both service efforts. When the behavior of manufacturer and retailer can not be verified, which leads to bilateral moral hazard, only the suboptimal solution of service effort can be achieved, and the contract based on output performance is optimal.