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本文对我国创业板上市公司的期权激励合约进行了实证研究,发现了如下特点及问题:(1)独立董事均被排除在期权激励对象之外;(2)行权价格的制定没有体现差异性,均选择监管层要求的最低价格,没有充分反映公司未来业绩的预期;(3)期权激励业绩考核指标单一,民营控股公司较国有控股公司激励条件更宽松;(4)期权激励数量距监管规定的上限仍有较大提升空间,国有控股公司的激励力度小于民营控股公司;(5)期权激励有效期总体上看刚刚满足监管层要求的下限,说明有效期整体偏短,长期激励效应不足;股票的禁售期仍有进一步延长的空间。论文第四部分对上述问题进行了理论分析,并提出相应的对策建议,以提高期权激励合约的实际激励效果。
This paper conducts an empirical research on the option incentive contract of listed companies in China’s GEM, and finds the following characteristics and problems: (1) Independent directors are excluded from the object of option incentive; (2) The formulation of exercise price does not reflect the difference (3) the index of performance evaluation of option incentive is single, the control of private holding company is more relaxed than the incentive of state holding company; (4) the number of option incentive is away from the regulatory requirements (5) The effective period of option incentive generally just meets the lower limit of the regulatory requirements, indicating that the overall validity period is too short, and the long-term incentive effect is not enough; the stock of the controlling shareholder of the state-owned holding company is less than the private holding company; The lock-up period still has room for further extension. The fourth part of the thesis makes a theoretical analysis of the above problems and puts forward corresponding countermeasures and suggestions to improve the actual incentive effect of the option incentive contract.