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两职结构的科学设置及如何降低管理层代理成本,历来是会计理论界研究的热点问题。运用2010—2014年间的A股上市公司样本数据,考察了两职结构改变对管理层直接代理成本和间接代理成本的影响,以及法治水平对二者关系的调节作用。研究发现:两职结构的分权式改变显著降低了管理层的直接代理成本和间接代理成本;两职结构的集权式改变显著增加了管理层的直接代理成本,不影响管理层的间接代理成本。进一步的分析发现,两职结构的分权式改变对管理层直接代理成本和间接代理成本的影响只在法治水平较低地区的企业中起作用,即法治水平越低,两职结构的分权式改变对管理层两类代理成本的影响越大;但法治水平不影响两职结构的集权式改变与管理层两类代理成本的关系。
The scientific structure of the two posts and how to reduce management agency costs have always been the hot topics in the field of accounting theory. Using the sample data of A-share listed companies during 2010-2014, we examine the impact of the changes in the two-position structure on the management direct agency costs and indirect agency costs and the regulatory role of the rule of law on the relationship between the two. The study found that the decentralized change of the two-position structure significantly reduced the direct and indirect agency costs of management; the centralized change of the two-position structure significantly increased management’s direct agency costs without affecting management’s indirect agency costs . Further analysis finds that the impact of decentralized changes in the two-tier structure on management direct agency costs and indirect agency costs only plays an important role in enterprises in lower-level jurisdictions, that is, the lower the level of the rule of law, the decentralization of the two-tier structure However, the level of the rule of law does not affect the relationship between the two types of agency costs and the change of the centralized structure of the two-position structure.