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本文构建一个两维度的重复博弈模型,从供应链中的重复交易关系视角分析公司和农户间契约自我实施的稳定性条件及其契约选择的一般理论。一个主要的发现是,所有权结构和关系性产权配置结构在相互制约中影响契约的稳定性和可自我实施性。当公司和农户偏好风险中性时,垂直一体化是对价格频繁且大幅波动的有效反应;是否纵向一体化取决于贴现率r,当贴现率足够低时,所有权结构开始变得无足轻重;而如果其他特征变量不变,最优所有权安排取决于报偿水平的高低。
This paper constructs a two-dimensional recurrence game model, and analyzes the stability conditions of contract self-implementation and the general theory of contract selection from the perspective of repeated transaction relationships in the supply chain. A major finding is that the ownership structure and the relational property allocation structure affect the stability and self-enforceability of the contract in mutual restraint. Vertical integration is an effective response to frequent and highly volatile prices when firms and farmers prefer risk neutrality; whether vertical integration depends on the discount rate r, ownership structures begin to become marginal when the discount rate is low enough; and if Other characteristic variables remain unchanged, and the optimal ownership arrangement depends on the level of compensation.