传统研究中把税收制度看作是征纳双方的一系列权利和义务的契约安排,且其制定带有国家强制性。因此从这一角度看税收制度的形成并不是征纳双方互相协调一致而达成的结果。但是若从博弈的角度分析却未必如此,因为税收征纳双方在制度制定前后能够根据对方的行动作出调整,最终达到“均衡”状态。这种博弈既影响着政府对税收制度的制定同时也影响企业的纳税行为。本文将在完全信息的假设基础上对征纳双方的税务筹划进行分析研究。 In the traditional research, the tax system was regarded as the contractual arrangement of a series of rights and obligations of both parties, and its formulation was mandatory by the state. Therefore, from this point of view, the formation of the tax system is not the result of the mutual coordination of both sides. However, if analyzed from a game perspective, this may not be the case because both tax authorities can make adjustments according to each other’s actions before and after the establishment of the system and finally reach a state of “equilibrium.” This game not only affects the government’s formulation of the tax system but also affects the corporate tax behavior. This article will be based on the assumption of complete information on the tax planning of both parties.