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生产者延伸责任(EPR)制度能有效推动制造商回收再制造活动的实施.基于制造商逆向选择和道德风险并存的状况,以制造商的再制造率和努力程度为不对称信息,设计政府对制造商的激励契约.给出了契约实施过程中满足制造商收益单调风险率和政府正向激励实施的现实条件,分析了再制造率等因素与政府激励契约的关系,讨论了EPR制度实施不同阶段中各类因素对政府期望收益的影响.研究表明:政府激励契约能较好实现制造商的高效度激励,有效促进制造商的努力水平,提高政府期望收益.研究结论对EPR制度下政府环境规制的设计实施以及制造商的运营实践具有较好的现实指导意义.
The system of producer extended liability (EPR) can effectively promote the implementation of manufacturer’s remanufacturing and remanufacturing activities.Based on the contradiction between manufacturer’s adverse selection and moral hazard coexistence and the manufacturer’s rework rate and effort as asymmetric information, The incentive contract of the manufacturer is given.It gives the monotonic risk rate of the manufacturer’s return and the actual condition of the government’s positive incentive in the process of the contract’s implementation.The relationship between the factors such as the remanufacturing rate and the government incentive contract is analyzed.The EPR system’s implementation is discussed Stage of the various factors on the government expected return.The study shows that: government incentive contract can better achieve manufacturer’s efficient incentive, effectively promote the manufacturer’s level of effort and improve the government’s expected return.Research conclusions of the government under the EPR environment The design of the regulation and the manufacturer’s operation have a good realistic guiding significance.