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本文在Spencer和Brander(1983)以及d’Aspremont和Jacquemin(1988)的研究基础上构建了一个三阶段的博弈模型,对战略贸易政策下的R&D活动补贴措施进行了分析。本文认为,当R&D活动的国际溢出处于较高水平时,各国政府有必要对本国企业从事的R&D活动采取事前补贴措施;而当R&D活动的国际溢出处于很高水平时,各国政府有必要对本国企业从事的R&D活动采取事前补贴和事后征税搭配的措施,本文还针对目前高新技术产业R&D活动国际溢出水平较高的情况,提出了政策建议。
Based on the research of Spencer and Brander (1983) and d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988), this paper constructs a three-stage game model and analyzes the R & D subsidies under the strategic trade policy. This paper argues that when the international spillover of R & D activities is at a high level, it is necessary for all governments to impose ex ante subsidies on the R & D activities undertaken by their own enterprises. When the international spillover of R & D activities is at a high level, it is necessary for governments of all countries The R & D activities carried out by the enterprises take the measures of ex ante subsidy and ex post taxation. This paper also puts forward policy suggestions in light of the high level of international spillover of R & D activities in hi-tech industries.