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本研究利用激励理论中多任务委托代理模型,来探讨医生兼差(即医生“走穴”)现象的微观激励机制,进而分析政府管制制度或行政管理措施对兼差者效用的影响。主要研究发现表明:(1)在医疗行业,政府对兼差行为的管制具有内生性,即受到薪酬制度中激励机制的影响;(2)简单的兼差禁制令,由于忽略并扭曲既有的激励机制,会经常失效;(3)在适当激励机制下,医院管理行为远比政府管制对兼差负面影响的约束力更大。
This study uses the multi-tasking proxy model in incentive theory to explore the micro-incentive mechanism of doctor-and-patient (“doctor”) phenomenon and then analyze the effect of government control system or administrative measures on the effectiveness of poor diversion. The main findings are as follows: (1) In the healthcare industry, the government’s endogenous control over poor performance is affected by the incentive mechanism in the pay system. (2) A simple CFD, which ignores and distorts the existing incentive mechanism , Will often fail; (3) Under the appropriate incentive mechanism, the hospital management behavior is far more binding than the government regulation on the negative effects of the government subsidies.