论文部分内容阅读
在信息不完全的证券市场中,上市公司内部人可以通过观察监管者不同的执法信号帮助其判断监管者的真实类型。文章以严格执法和普通执法作为信号推证了混同均衡、分离均衡及准分离均衡存在的条件。不论在何种均衡路径上,强监管者的预期收益总是大于或等于弱监管者的预期收益,因此,弱监管者有动力通过执法行为提高其执法禀赋,从而向强监管者演化。对于弱监管者来说,两类监管者都选择严格执法的混同均衡是最理想的,为了达到这一混同均衡,需要在两个方面做出努力:一是降低自身的执法成本,二是加大对内部人寻租的惩罚力度。
In the incomplete information security market, insiders of listed companies can help them to judge the real type of supervisors by observing the supervisors’ different law enforcement signals. The article uses strict law enforcement and ordinary law enforcement as signals to confirm the conditions of mixture equilibrium, separation equilibrium and quasi-separation equilibrium. Regardless of the equilibrium path, the expected return on strong regulators is always greater than or equal to the expected return on weak regulators, so weak regulators have the incentive to enforce their law enforcement endowments through law enforcement to evolve toward strong regulators. For the weak regulators, both types of supervisors choose the perfect mix of law enforcement is the ideal balance, in order to achieve this hybrid equilibrium, efforts need to be made in two aspects: First, to reduce their own costs of law enforcement, the second is to increase Great punishment for internal rent-seeking efforts.