以往关于庚子宣战前清廷对义和团策略的研究过于侧重对上谕本身的解读,或多或少地忽视了当时不断变化的内外局势对清廷发布相关上谕的影响,以致无法揭示其策略复杂变动的背景。实际上,自1899年底义和团运动走向高潮起,清廷对义和团的策略经历了一个相当谨慎的渐趋强硬的过程。尤其是1900年春天义和团向直隶中部发展后,在来自团民和列强两方的压力不断加大的形势下,清廷的上谕虽然在措辞上愈发激烈,又每每不忘提醒地方官员和统兵将领不得激变生事,显得十分矛盾和不具有可操作性,以致一些坚决主张剿杀的文武官员备感束手束脚。 In the past, the study of the Boxer Strategy on Qing court before Geng war preempted too much on the interpretation of the upper encyclical and more or less ignored the influence of the changing internal and external situations on the issue of the relevant upper encyclical, so that it could not reveal its strategy Complex changes in the background. In fact, from the very beginning of the Boxer Rebellion to the climax in late 1899, the Qing court’s policy toward the Boxers underwent a rather cautious and gradually tougher process. Especially since the Boxers began to develop in central China in the spring of 1900 and the pressure from both the CYL and the two powers continued to increase, the letter from the Qing court, although increasingly fierce in wording, often reminded local officials It is very contradictory and impractical that the generals and the generals will not be able to make radical changes. As a result, some civil and military officials who resolutely advocate the suppression of extermination will find themselves very helpless.