供应链契约是否与公司违约行为相关是一个非常值得研究的问题。我们的论文通过建立期权博弈模型对供应契约双方的行为进行研究。研究结果表明存在一个最优的破产价值水平使下游厂商获得最大化的支付,而这个价值水平事实上内生于供应链契约。而另一方面,下游厂商的这种策略行为将导致上游厂商的最优定价策略表现为非线性定价的形式。 Whether the supply chain contract is related to the company’s breach of contract is a question worth studying. Our thesis studies the behavior of both sides of the supply contract by establishing an option game model. The results of the research show that there is an optimal level of bankruptcy value that allows downstream firms to maximize their payments, and that this level of value is actually inherent in the supply chain contract. On the other hand, this tactical behavior of downstream vendors will lead to the upstream vendor’s optimal pricing strategy in the form of nonlinear pricing.