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1932年以后,蒋介石对“剿共”与解决地方实力派的关系的处理始终有着“清醒”认识,实难得出蒋有意纵共以削弱地方实力派的结论。“剿共”背景下蒋对西南的实际运作更多的是一种顺势而为。对于蒋方资料中貌似有纵共之嫌的言论,实不必作过多想象和发挥。对“剿共”与解决地方实力派的关系虽有“清醒”认识,并不必然表明蒋“剿共”态度坚决。在日本侵略的强大压力下,蒋对“剿共”有过动摇,但基本上只是一闪而过的念头,很快又重回“剿共”优先的轨道,念念不忘的还是非先安内不能攘外。至于所谓纵共讨好苏俄,以换回蒋经国,则是一些论者对蒋主观意图的大胆想象,并不符合蒋的处事逻辑。
After 1932, Chiang Kai-shek always had a “clear-headed” understanding of how to handle the relationship between the “suppression of the communist party” and the solution of the local power faction. In the context of Chiang Kai-shek’s “suppression of the Communist Party,” Chiang’s practice of the Southwest is more of a homeopathic. There is indeed no need to make too much imagination or give play to the Chiang Kai-shek’s seemingly outrageous remarks. Although there is a clear understanding of the relationship between the “suppression of the Communist Party” and the solution of the local strength, it does not necessarily indicate that Chiang is resolute in his “suppression of the communist party.” Under the strong pressure of Japan’s aggression, Chiang was shaken by the suppression of the Communist Party, but basically it was only a fleeting idea that he soon returned to the priority track of “suppression of the communist party.” First security can not be stalled. As for the so-called longitudinal co-opting of Soviet Russia in exchange for Chiang Ching-kuo, it is some of the bold imagination of some of the subjective intentions of Chiang and does not conform to Chiang’s logic of doing things.