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布兰顿对人类实践有过细密的刻画。理解人类实践可先从人禽之辨入手。从社会实践角度看,禽兽至多只是单纯实践者,而非解释性实践者;从语言实践角度看,禽兽无法掌握关于概念的各种推论。布兰顿将人类实践描绘为给出与要求理由的游戏,游戏者互相进行道义计分,记录彼此的道义地位:承诺与资格。然而人类实践斑驳陆离,布兰顿的模型未必能覆盖其中的方方面面,但却不失为对哲学论理事业一个妥贴的勾画。通过这个模型,我们可以理解如下四项哲学实践:1)康德吁请公共道义计分;2)哲学出版中的道义计分;3)哲学对话中的道义计分;4)哲学论辩中的道义计分。
Brandon had a detailed description of human practices. Understanding of human practices can be the first to distinguish between human and poultry. From a social practice point of view, beasts are, at best, merely practitioners, not interpretive practitioners; from the point of view of language practice, beasts can not grasp various inferences about concepts. Brandon portrays human practices as giving and justifying the game, in which gamers scientifically rate each other and document each other’s moral status: promises and qualifications. However, human practice mottled, Brandon’s model may not be able to cover all aspects, but it is still a proper outline of the philosophical reasoning. Through this model, we can understand the following four philosophical practices: 1) Kant appeals to public moral scoring; 2) moral scoring in the publishing of philosophy; 3) moral scoring in philosophical dialogue; 4) morality in philosophical discourse Minute.