本文通过分析经理人员会计政策选择的机会主义观和有效契约观,得出经理人员选择什么会计政策,主要取决于企业的契约机制。经理人员能否按照企业所有者意愿(有效契约观)选择会计政策,取决于企业的契约是否为经理人员提供了足够的激励。通过一个模型的分析可得,一个激励可行的契约应当满足: (1)经理人员与企业所有者共享风险;(2)应当尽可能多的利用一切可以利用的信息。 By analyzing the opportunist view and effective contract view of manager’s accounting policy selection, this paper draws the conclusion that what accounting policies managers choose depends on the contractual mechanism of the enterprise. Whether managers choose accounting policies in accordance with the wishes of business owners (the concept of a valid contract) depends on whether the firm’s contracts provide sufficient incentives for managers. From a model analysis, a viable contract should be satisfied: (1) Managers share risks with business owners; (2) Make the most of all available information.