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中国上市公司的年报披露期限是120天,这甚至超过了美国SEC制定的33-8128和33-8644规则生效以前美国上市公司的年报披露期限,意味着中国企业和美国企业相比有更长的年报审计时间。中国上市公司年报披露期限的不同可以为我们研究审计延迟和盈余管理之间的关系提供一个独特的视角。实证结果表明,两者关系依赖于盈余管理的方向:对于盈余管理为正的公司,两者之间存在突增的正相关关系;相反,对于盈余管理为负的公司,两者之间存在着突弱的负相关关系。这种相反的非线性关系可以用审计延迟对盈余管理的两种效应来解释:一个是通过审计师,即审计报表时间越长,盈余管理越低;另一个是通过管理者,即准备报表时间越长,盈余管理越高。对于中国和其它发展中国家来说,本文的实证结果可以为其市场监管主体在加快财务报告披露方面提供有益的参考。
The annual report disclosure period for Chinese listed companies is 120 days, which is even more than the disclosure period of annual reports of US public companies before the entry into force of regulations 33-8128 and 33-8644 stipulated by the SEC in the United States, which means that Chinese enterprises have a longer Annual report audit time. The differences in the disclosure deadlines of Chinese listed companies’ annual reports provide a unique perspective for us to study the relationship between audit delay and earnings management. The empirical results show that the relationship between the two depends on the direction of earnings management: for companies with positive earnings management, there is a sharp positive correlation between the two; on the contrary, for the companies with negative earnings management, there exists a Weak negative correlation. This opposite non-linear relationship can be explained by two effects of audit delay on earnings management: one is through the auditor, the longer the audit report is, the lower the earnings management; and the other is through the manager, which prepares the report time The longer, the higher the earnings management. For China and other developing countries, the empirical results in this paper can provide useful references for the market regulators to speed up the disclosure of financial reports.