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本文在考虑技术溢出和项目研发成功的概率影响基础上,通过引入公司R&D(研发)投资的政府财税收优惠政策,建立一个基于R&D竞争和R&D合作形式的完全信息二阶段动态博弈模型,对公司最佳R&D投资量进行分析。本文研究发现,当税收优惠较高或者税收优惠不高且研发技术溢出水平比较低时,可以鼓励企业独立进行R&D投入;而当税收优惠不高且研发技术溢出水平比较高时,应该鼓励企业进行R&D合作。据此,本文提出相应的政策性建议。
Based on the probabilistic influence of technology spillover and project R & D success, this paper establishes a two-stage dynamic game model of complete information based on R & D competition and R & D cooperation by introducing the preferential government and taxation policies of R & D investment. The best R & D investment for analysis. This study finds that when the tax preference is high or the tax preference is not high and the R & D spillover level is relatively low, enterprises can be encouraged to invest R & D independently. When the tax preference is not high and the R & D spillover level is relatively high, enterprises should be encouraged R & D cooperation. Accordingly, this article puts forward the corresponding policy suggestion.