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官员具有“经济人”的特征,既有实施腐败行为的可能,也有不实施腐败行为的可能,其内生动力取决于成本收益分析建构的决策空间,依赖于制度建设的质量和官员个人的羞耻度。反腐败的成效好坏不限于要求、规定或条例堆砌的多少,而更多地取决于是否能从制度要素建设升级为显性制度架构与隐性制度结构并重的制度体系网络建构。
Officials have the characteristics of “economic man ”, both the possibility of implementing corrupt behavior and the possibility of not implementing corrupt behavior. The endogenous power depends on the decision-making space constructed by cost-benefit analysis, depending on the quality of system construction and individual officials Shame degree. The effectiveness of anti-corruption is not limited to the number of requirements, rules or regulations, but more depends on whether it can be upgraded from institutional elements into an institutional network with equal emphasis on explicit and implicit institutional structures.