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当前,城市非理性扩张,房价不断攀升、土地市场秩序混乱等问题日益凸显,这离不开地方政府的土地市场行为。大多数学者在财政分权制度下分析土地问题,通常关注的是地方政府间横向竞争对土地问题的影响。本文关注的是中央与地方纵向财政竞争下的土地问题,地方政府利用信息优势来对分权的边界进行事实上的调整,通过体制外收入扩大了自己的财政份额,来弥补中央政府所确定的财政分权对地方政府的不利影响,中央政府重新对财政权力进行分配,将非正式资金纳入到国家正规的税收体制中来,使得地方政府进一步寻找新的体制外来源化解中央的压力。正是中央与地方政府间的财政竞争导致地方政府依赖非正式资金体系来获得可支配收入,在这一过程中,地方政府越来越依赖土地财政,土地逐渐成为地方政府获得非正式收入的最重要的渠道,因此引发了一系列土地问题。中央与地方政府的财政竞争是当前严重土地问题的深层次的制度根源。
At present, the irrational expansion of cities, rising house prices, and disorderly land market problems have become increasingly prominent, which can not be separated from the land market behavior of local governments. Most scholars analyze the issue of land under the fiscal decentralization system, usually focusing on the impact of horizontal competition among local governments on land issues. This paper focuses on the issue of land under the vertical fiscal competition between the central and local governments. Local governments make use of information superiority to make de facto adjustments to the decentralized boundaries and expand their financial share through extra-system income to make up for the loss The negative impact of fiscal decentralization on local governments, the central government to re-allocation of financial power, the informal funds into the formal tax system to make local governments to further find new sources of external system to resolve the pressure of the Central Government. It is the financial competition between the central and local governments that led local governments to rely on the informal funding system to obtain disposable income. In the process, local governments are increasingly dependent on land finance, and land is gradually becoming the most abundant source of informal income for local governments Important channel, thus triggering a series of land issues. The fiscal competition between the central and local governments is a deep-rooted institutional root cause of the current grave land issue.