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研究在需求和产量均为随机变量的情况下,带有损失规避偏好的零售商之间的博弈.当多个相同的零售商向同一供应商订购时,如果总需求按照每个零售商的订购量在总订购量中所占比例进行分配,则该博弈中存在唯一的对称性Nash均衡,且总均衡订购量关于损失规避水平递减,关于零售商数量递增.此外,如果损失规避水平(零售商数量)高于(低于)临界值,则竞争情况下供应链总库存水平比集中管理情况下的低.仿真实验验证了上述结果.
To study the game between retailers with loss avoidance preference when the demand and output are both random variables.When multiple same retailers order from the same supplier, if total demand follows each retailer’s order There is a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium in the game, and the total equilibrium order decreases with decreasing levels of loss avoidance, with an increase in the number of retailers.In addition, if the level of loss avoidance (retailer Quantity) is above (below) the critical value, the total inventory level of the supply chain under competition is lower than in the case of centralized management.The simulation results verify the above results.