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研究由两个产品制造商和上游碳配额供应商所组成的供应链系统的生产和交易决策问题.通过建立经济主体的主从博弈模型,得到它们之间互为反应函数的纳什均衡解,并在此基础上设定其为产品碳排放量和排放上限的函数.分析表明,产品碳排放量和政府排放上限对两制造商和碳配额供应商最优变量以及利润值的影响呈反向关系;在两制造商严格控制排放量和政府科学制定排放上限的前提下,两级主体可通过某种契约进一步提高各自的利润值.
This paper studies the production and trade decision-making of the supply chain system composed of two product manufacturers and upstream carbon quota suppliers.By establishing the principal-subordinate game model of economic agents, we obtain their Nash equilibrium solutions Based on this, it is set as a function of the product carbon emission and the emission ceiling.The analysis shows that the product carbon emission and the government emission cap have a negative relationship with the optimal variables and profit value of the two manufacturers and carbon quota suppliers ; Under strict control of emissions by both manufacturers and government science to set emission caps, two-tier entities can further increase their respective profits through some kind of contract.