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本文针对零售商竞争型的两级闭环供应链系统,探讨了在间接回收渠道下制造商和零售商的定价决策,以及如何防范零售商合谋的机制设计问题。研究结果表明:零售商合谋增加了其自身的利润却降低了制造商的利润,并导致了销售价格的提高及回收率的降低,从而也损害了消费者和社会的利益。随着竞争程度加剧,零售商的合谋导致制造商利润的损失也加剧。防范机制可以有效地防范零售商合谋,并增加制造商的利润,然而并不能使其利润达到零售商不合谋时的水平。
In this paper, a retailer-competitive two-stage closed-loop supply chain system is discussed in this paper. The pricing decisions of manufacturers and retailers in the indirect recycling channel and the mechanism design of how to prevent collusion between retailers are discussed. The results show that: Retailers colluding to increase their own profits but reduce the manufacturer’s profits, and led to increased sales prices and lower recovery, thus undermining the interests of consumers and society. As competition intensifies, the collusion of retailers has led to a further increase in the profitability of manufacturers. Preventive mechanisms can effectively prevent collusion between retailers and increase the profits of manufacturers, however, do not bring their profits to the level at which retailers did not conspire.