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在胡塞尔视域中,自然主义意识研究的非科学性主要体现为迷信自然科学范式,使意识自然化,疏离真正的心理现象。这使其认识论基础含糊、思路陷入循环论,视域上偏离纯粹意识领域,理论上导致怀疑论。对此,自然主义者没有深刻认识,这导致了不良影响。胡塞尔以后的自然主义意识研究及其认识论也不能避免以上问题。对于自然主义者而言,胡塞尔走向现象学的方案过于激进,引入现象学方案则较为稳妥,但任重而道远。
In Husserl’s view, the unscientific nature of the study of naturalistic consciousness is mainly embodied in the scientific paradigm of superstition and naturalization of consciousness, alienating the real psychological phenomenon. This makes its basic epistemological ambiguity, thinking into a cycle of theory, deviate from the field of pure consciousness, theoretically lead to skepticism. In this regard, naturalists do not have a profound understanding, which led to adverse effects. Husserl’s naturalistic consciousness and his epistemology can not avoid the above problems. For the naturalists, Husserl’s approach to phenomenology is too radical and the introduction of phenomenological solutions is more secure, but a long way to go.