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随着市场经济的深入发展,社会财富的分配主体日益多元化。多个利益主体(国家、所有者、债权人、职工、管理者、社会公众)的利益在数学概念下的不一致性,使各个主体都会直接或间接地干预会计反映经济事项、提供会计信息。近年来,在所有者、经营者的干预下,假账泛滥,会计信息失真。严重干扰着正常的经济秩序。为此,政府把会计打假提上了议事日程。借鉴国际经验,颁布和完善了一系列会计法规。旨在规范会计行为,强化会计的监督职能。但对遏制假账效果并不显著,仍然是治标不治本。在这种形势下,会计理论界认为会计信息失真、会计监督不力主要是会计管理体制有问题。要想加大会计监督力度,就必须使监督的主体与客体分离。会计委派制
With the further development of market economy, the distribution of social wealth is increasingly diversified. The inconsistency of the interests of multiple stakeholders (state, owner, creditor, employee, manager, public) under the concept of mathematics enables each subject to directly or indirectly intervene in accounting to reflect economic matters and provide accounting information. In recent years, with the intervention of owners and operators, fake accounts have been flooding and accounting information has been distorted. Serious interference with the normal economic order. To this end, the government put accounting fraud into the agenda. Learn from international experience, enacted and perfected a series of accounting regulations. Designed to regulate accounting practices, strengthen the supervision of accounting functions. However, the effect of curbing false accounts is not significant and is still a temporary solution. In this situation, accounting theory circles think accounting information distortion, weak accounting supervision mainly accounting management system has problems. If we want to increase the intensity of accounting supervision, we must separate the subject from the object of supervision. Accounting appointments