论文部分内容阅读
通过构建工程项目施工安全监管行为的演化博弈模型,从组织机制角度探索施工安全事故的根源,并依此给出安全管理的改进建议,为安全管理的相关人员提供参考。研究发现:监管员和施工员双方所承担的安全行为成本、安全处罚风险及安全事故风险之间的数量关系变化是系统安全行为演化发展的动力;降低安全行为成本、提高安全处罚以及增强安全事故风险感知,能够有利于两类人员重视安全。
Through the construction of evolutionary game model of construction safety supervision behavior of construction project, the root causes of construction safety accident are explored from the perspective of organizational mechanism, and the suggestions for improvement of safety management are given accordingly to provide references for relevant personnel of safety management. The study found that: the change of the quantitative relationship between the cost of safety behavior, the risk of safety punishment and the risk of accident of safety undertaken by both supervisors and constructors is the driving force for the evolvement and development of system safety behavior; reduce the cost of safety behavior, enhance safety punishment and enhance safety accident Risk perception, can be conducive to two types of personnel attention to safety.